On the Efficiency of Connection Charges---Part II: Integration of
  Distributed Energy Resources by Munoz-Alvarez, Daniel et al.
1On the Efficiency of Connection Charges—
Part II: Integration of Distributed Energy Resources
Daniel Munoz-Alvarez, Juan F. Garcia-Franco and Lang Tong
Abstract—This two-part paper addresses the design of retail
electricity tariffs for distribution systems with distributed energy
resources (DERs). Part I presents a framework to optimize
an ex-ante two-part tariff for a regulated monopolistic retailer
who faces stochastic wholesale prices on the one hand and
stochastic demand on the other. In Part II, the integration of
DERs is addressed by analyzing their endogenous effect on the
optimal two-part tariff and the induced welfare gains. Two DER
integration models are considered: (i) a decentralized model
involving behind-the-meter DERs in a net metering setting, and
(ii) a centralized model involving DERs integrated by the retailer.
It is shown that DERs integrated under either model can
achieve the same social welfare and the net-metering tariff
structure is optimal. The retail prices under both integration
models are equal and reflect the expected wholesale prices. The
connection charges differ and are affected by the retailer’s fixed
costs as well as the statistical dependencies between wholesale
prices and behind-the-meter DERs. In particular, the connection
charge of the decentralized model is generally higher than that
of the centralized model.
An empirical analysis is presented to estimate the impact
of DER on welfare distribution and inter-class cross-subsidies
using real price and demand data and simulations. The analysis
shows that, with the prevailing retail pricing and net-metering,
consumer welfare decreases with the level of DER integration.
Issues of cross-subsidy and practical drawbacks of decentralized
integration are also discussed.
Index Terms—Retail tariff design, dynamic pricing, connection
charges, distributed energy resources, renewables, storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS two-part paper studies the design of dynamic retailelectricity tariffs for distribution systems with distributed
renewable and storage resources. We consider a regulated
monopolistic retailer who, on the one hand, serves residential
customers with stochastic demands, and on the other hand,
interfaces with an exogenous wholesale market with stochastic
prices. In this framework, we analyze both customer-integrated
and retailer-integrated distributed energy resources (DERs).
Our goal is to shed lights on the widely adopted net metering
compensation mechanism and the efficiency loss implied by
some of the prevailing retail tariffs when an increasing amount
of DERs are integrated into the distribution system.
While Part I [1] establishes a framework to analyze the
efficiency of revenue adequate tariffs with connection charges,
Part II extends it to address the integration of DERs.
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The main contribution of Part II is twofold. First, we
characterize analytically the optimal revenue adequate ex-ante
two-part tariff for a distribution system with renewables and
storage integrated by customers or the retailer. We characterize
the consumer (and social) welfare achieved by the optimal
two-part tariff under both integration models. This analysis
is an application of the classical Ramsey pricing theory [2]
with extensions to accommodate the multi-period integration
of stochastic DERs. Second, we analyze a numerical case
study based on empirical data that estimates the increasingly
larger inefficiencies and interclass cross-subsidies caused by
DERs when net metering tariffs with price markups are used to
maintain revenue adequacy. In this context, the derived optimal
two-part tariffs and a centralized DER integration model offer
two alternatives to mitigate these undesirable effects.
The main results of Part II are as follows. We leverage
the retail tariff design framework established in [1] to ac-
commodate the integration of DERs by customers (in a net-
metering setting) and by the retailer in Section II. The extended
framework considers heterogeneous customers with arbitrary
behind-the-meter renewables and storage. Therein, we derive
the optimal ex-ante two-part tariff under both DER integration
models and the combined effect of this tariff and DERs on
consumer and social welfare.
We find that under the optimal two-part tariff, DERs inte-
grated under either model bring the same gains in social and
consumer welfare. This is in contrast to prevailing volumetric
tariffs under which the integration of DERs can increase or
decrease social and consumer welfare depending critically on
the integration model and the retailer’s fixed costs. Indeed,
we demonstrate that the two-part tariff structure is optimal in
the sense that no other tariff structure —however complex—
can achieve a strictly higher social welfare. This means that
the two-part net metering tariff of the decentralized model is
optimal as a DER compensation mechanism.
These welfare effects are explained by the structure of the
optimal ex-ante two-part tariff. We show that under both inte-
gration models the derived tariff consists of an identical time-
varying price and a distinct connection charge. In particular,
the time-varying price reflects the wholesale prices and their
statistical correlation with the elasticity of the random demand.
The optimal connection charge allocates uniformly among
customers the retailer’s fixed costs and additional costs and
savings caused by risks and the integrated DERs. Indeed, while
savings from retailer-integrated DERs reduce the connection
charge, customer-integrated DERs induce slight increments or
reductions caused by risks introduced by renewables.
The theoretical analysis of DER integration is comple-
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2mented in Section III with an empirical study based on
publicly available data from NYISO and the largest utility
company in New York City. The performance of the optimal
ex-ante two-part tariffs is compared with several other ex-
ante tariffs for different levels of DER penetration, under both
integration models. Tariffs used as benchmarks include the
optimal linear tariff and two-part flat tariffs used extensively
in practice by utilities. In particular, relative to a base case
with a nominal two-part flat tariff and no DERs, we estimate
the efficiency gains or losses brought by tariff changes in
Section III-A. Subsequently, in Section III-B, we estimate
the efficiency gains or loses brought by the integration of
DERs under both integration models and the various ex-ante
considered tariffs. Most notably, our results estimate that the
efficiency gains brought by switching from flat to hourly
pricing, which are below 1% (of the utility’s gross revenue)
for most relevant cases, can be more than tripled by a $10
increase in the monthly connection charge. Moreover, for the
case with customer-integrated DERs, we estimate in Section
III-C the indirect cross-subsidies that customers without DERs
give to DER-owning customers due to net metering tariffs with
marked-up retail prices. All our estimations in this case study
assume a stylized model for thermostatically controlled loads.
Concluding remarks and proof sketches of the main results
are included in Section IV and the Appendix, respectively.
Detailed proofs of all results can be found in [3].
A. Related Work
The literature on retail electricity tariff design is extensive
[4], and there is an increasing interest in addressing the
integration of DERs. We briefly discuss works that are relevant
to our paper. Based on their main focus, we group these works
into two categories: (i) tariff design for fixed cost recovery
with DERs, and (ii) optimal demand response with DERs.
1) Tariff design for fixed cost recovery with DERs: The
general principles used in retail tariff design are briefly re-
viewed in [5] and more extensively in [6], and the additional
challenges brought by DERs are discussed in [7]. In the light
of such challenges, current tariff design practices and broader
regulatory issues are being revised in comprehensive studies
to address the adoption of DERs [8]–[10].
Research efforts to study more specific issues of DER
integration such as [11]–[14] have also emerged. For instance,
in [12], the trade-off between multiple tariff design criteria
is studied in a multi-objective optimization framework. An
analytical approach leverages a generation capacity investment
model in [14] to characterize sufficient conditions for RTP and
flat tariffs to be revenue adequate. More empirical approaches
are conducted in [11], where interclass cross-subsidies and
revenue shortfalls caused by net metering tariffs are estimated,
and in [13], which estimates the impact of tariff structure and
net metering on the deployment of distributed solar PV.
Finally, there is an increasing volume of literature study-
ing the “death spiral” of DER adoption [15]–[21], which is
presented as a threat on the financial viability of utilities.
This threat refers to a self-reinforcing feedback loop of DER
adoption involving a decline in energy sales and the persistent
attempt to recover utilities’ fixed costs by increasing volu-
metric charges. The empirical analysis in [16], for example,
models the effect that price feedback loops may have on
the adoption of solar PV and concludes that it may not be
significant within the next decade. In [18], an extensive list
of factors that affect the system dynamics of DER adoption
is presented. It concludes that while the feedback loop is
possible, it is not predetermined and can be avoided. A stylized
demand model is used in [19] to argue that a minimum of price
elasticity is required for the threat to be an actual problem.
The work in [21] provides an estimate of the evolution of
the lowest-cost configuration (namely grid only, grid+solar, or
grid+solar+battery) for residential and commercial customers
to satisfy their load in the long-term for a few U.S. cities.
There are still important gaps in this subject. For example,
none of the works above studies the efficiency loss and, with
the exception of [11], the interclass cross-subsidies entailed
by the adoption of DERs under net metering tariffs. This is
precisely a focus of our work.
2) Optimal demand response with DERs: Many works
focus on deriving optimal retail pricing schemes to induce
desired electricity consumption behavior on customers with
DERs such as [22]–[25]. For example, in [24], the authors
consider customer and retailer integrated renewables and
storage separately in a setting similar to ours. They derive
dynamic linear tariffs that maximize an objective that balances
the retailer profit and customers’ welfare. Unlike our work,
however, none of these works consider explicitly a revenue
adequacy constraint nor the use of connection charges.
II. RETAIL TARIFF DESIGN WITH DERS
A. Multi-period Ramsey Pricing under Uncertainty
Consider a regulator who sets a retail electricity tariff T
in advance (ex-ante) to maximize the welfare of M customers
over a billing cycle of N time periods, subject to a net revenue
sufficiency constraint for the monopolistic retailer serving the
load. Expectations are used to deal with the uncertainties that
naturally arise when fixing a tariff in advance of actual usage.
To quantify the customers’ welfare we use the notion of
consumers’ surplus, which measures the difference between
the gross benefit derived from consumption and what the
customer pays for it. Formally, we assume that given a tariff
T , customer i consumes a profile qi(T, ωi) ∈ RN within the
N -period billing cycle contingent on the random evolution of
the local state ωi = (ωi1, . . . , ω
i
N ) ∈ RN , provided that qi is
purchased from the retailer. Accordingly, customer i derives
an expected surplus
csi(T ) = E
[
Si(qi(T, ωi), ωi)− T (qi(T, ωi))], (1)
where T : RN → R and Si(qi(T, ωi), ωi) is the derived gross
benefit. Collectively, customers derive an expected consumer
surplus cs(T ) = E[
∑M
i=1 cs
i(T )], where the expectation is
taken with respect to the M -tuple ω = (ω1, . . . , ωM ).
Similarly, the expected retailer surplus or net revenue is
rs(T ) = E
[∑M
i=1T (q
i(T, ωi))− λ>q(T, ω)], (2)
3where λ ∈ RN is the profile of random real-time wholesale
prices, q(T, ω) is the aggregated demand profile, λ>q(T, ω)
is the energy cost faced by the retailer, and the expectation is
over the uncertain evolution of the global state ξ = (λ, ω).
Adding the consumer and retailer surplus together yields
the (expected) social surplus sw(T ) = cs(T ) + rs(T ) which
quantifies the social welfare induced by a tariff T .
We can now formulate the regulator’s tariff design problem
as the optimization problem
max
T (·)
cs(T ) s.t. rs(T ) = F, (3)
where F is a constant representing the non-energy costs faced
by the retailer that need to be passed on to its customers1.
As such, (3) is a version of the Ramsey pricing problem2. In
particular, we consider ex-ante two-part tariffs3 T (q) = A +
pi>q with connection charge A ∈ R and time-varying price pi ∈
RN . These tariffs induce an individual consumption profile
qi(T, ωi) = Di(pi, ωi), where Di(·, ωi) is a demand function
assumed to be nonnegative, continuously differentiable in pi,
and with a negative definite Jacobian ∇piDi(pi, ωi) ∈ RN×N
that satisfies the following assumption4.
Assumption 1. g(pi) = E[∇piD(pi, ω)(pi−λ)] is such that the
Jacobian matrix ∇g(pi) is negative definite (nd).
In the following sections we accommodate the integration
of DERs into the tariff design framework above. To that end,
we assume that either customers or the retailer have access
to distributed renewable and storage resources. We model an
agent’s access to renewables as the ability to use a state-
contingent energy profile r ∈ RN+ at no cost. Similarly, we
model access to a storage with capacity θ ∈ R+ as the ability
to offset energy needs with any vector of storage discharges
s ∈ RN in the operation constraint set5
U(θ) =
{
s ∈ RN
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ −∑kt=1st ≤ θ, k = 1, . . . , N} .
We define the (arbitrage) value of the storage given a deter-
ministic price vector pi ∈ RN as
V S(pi, θ) = max
s∈RN
{
pi>s
∣∣∣ s ∈ U(θ)} , (4)
and let s∗(pi, θ) denote an optimal solution of (4).
In what follows, we focus on characterizing solutions to
problem (3) considering DERs integrated either behind the
meter by customers in a net-metering setting or by the retailer.
B. Decentralized (behind-the-meter) DER Integration
Suppose that customers install renewables and a battery
behind the meter. Let ri(ωi) ∈ RN and si ∈ RN denote the
1F may include delivery, metering, and customer service costs, and it may
also recognize that a regulated firm should be allowed to earn some profit.
2Ramsey pricing is pricing efficiently subject to a breakeven constraint
[2]. With (3), we seek to apply Ramsey pricing to a single service with time-
varying, random marginal costs and temporally dependent stochastic demands.
3This restriction may involve no loss of generality (see Thm. 2 below).
4A detailed discussion on the implications of this assumption and special
cases when it is satisfied can be found in Part I [1].
5The lossless storage model defined by U(θ), which assumes no initial
charge nor charging/discharging rate limits, involves no loss of generality
since more complex storage models can be accommodated redefining U(θ).
energy customer i obtains from renewable resources in state ωi
and from the battery, respectively, and let θi ∈ R+ represent its
storage capacity. We operate in a net-metering setting where
tariffs depend only on di = qi − ri − si, which we use to
represent customer i’s net-metered demand. Hence, given a
tariff T (d) = A+pi>d, customer i chooses consumption qik and
storage operation sik at each time k contingent on ω
i
1, . . . , ω
i
k
to solve the multistage stochastic program
csi(T ) = max
qi(·),si(·)
E[Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− T (di(ωi))], (5a)
s.t si(ωi) ∈ U(θi). (5b)
A key observation is that the linearity of two-part tariffs
implies that customer i’s problem (5) can be separated into two
sub-problems: choosing qi(·) to maximize E[Si(qi(ωi), ωi)−
pi>qi(ωi)] − A and choosing si(·) to maximize E[pi>si(ωi)]
subject to (5b). The former problem is equivalent to that of
customers without DERs analyzed in [1], whose solution char-
acterizes the demand function Di(pi, ωi). As for the second
sub-problem, it is clear from (4) that s∗(pi, θi) is an optimal
solution. These solutions constitute an optimal solution to (5)
and thus a net demand function
di(pi, ωi) = Di(pi, ωi)− ri(ωi)− s∗(pi, θi). (6)
This fundamental separation of the customer’s problem yields
the following result, where we use r(ω) =
∑M
i=1 r
i(ωi) and
s =
∑M
i=1 s
i for notational convenience.
Theorem 1. Suppose that customers have access to re-
newables and storage as characterized in (5) and (6). If
∇piD(pi, ω) and λ are uncorrelated6, then the two-part tariff
T ∗DEC that solves problem (3) is given by pi
∗
DEC = λ and
A∗DEC = A
∗ − 1M Tr (Cov (λ, r(ω))) , (7)
where A∗, the connection charge in the absence of DER, would
be given by A∗ = 1M
(
F + Tr(Cov(λ,D(λ, ω)))
)
.
Before discussing some implications of Theorem 1, we
examine the condition that ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ are uncorrelated.
This condition holds in many situations. In particular, it holds
for demands that are not much affected by consumers’ local
randomness, such as the charging of electric vehicles and
typical household appliances. It even holds for smart HVAC
loads that are affected by random temperature fluctuations
since their demand takes the form D(pi, ω) = D(pi) + b(ω),
i.e., a demand with additive disturbances [26].
The tariff T ∗DEC in Thm. 1 reveals the following. Letting
retail prices reflect an unbiased estimate of the marginal costs
of electricity (λ) maximizes social and consumer welfare.
Under net metering, this implies that the retailer should buy
customers’ energy surplus (from DERs) at the same price that
he buys energy at the wholesale market (in expectation).
The expression for A∗DEC in (7) has an intuitive interpreta-
tion. It indicates that the integration of behind-the-meter DERs
would require adjustments to the connection charge. These
adjustments could be positive if the integrated renewables tend
to cause wholesale prices to drop (i.e., negative correlation),
6The absence of decentralized storage makes this condition unnecessary.
4gain
(a) Optimal two-part tariffs.
Fig. 1: Efficient Pareto fronts or rs-cs tradeoff induced by optimal ex-ante
two-part tariffs T ∗DEC (solid line) and T ∗ (dashed line) with and without DERs.
but they could be negative otherwise. Consequently, these
adjustments can increase or decrease the consumer surplus of
customers without DERs because the former are perceived by
all customers as changes in their electricity bills.
The welfare gains brought by decentralized DERs depend
critically on retail tariffs. To assess the performance of two-
part tariffs in this regard we first need a point of comparison. In
the absence of DERs, T ∗DEC reduces to the optimal ex-ante two-
part tariff T ∗(q) = A∗ + pi∗>q derived in [1], where pi∗ = λ
under the assumption in Theorem 1. As a point of comparison,
consider that in the absence of DERs and under tariff T ∗,
customers derive an expected surplus cs0(T ∗) = sw
∗
0 − F ,
the retailer derives rs0(T ∗) = F , and social welfare is
sw∗0 =
M∑
i=1
E
[
Si(Di(pi∗, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi∗, ωi)]. (8)
Corollary 1. Under the tariff T ∗DEC, customer-integrated
DERs induce an expected total surplus sw(T ∗DEC) = sw
∗
0 +∑M
i=1 V
S(λ, θi) + E[λ>ri(ωi)] that is independent of F and
cs(T ∗DEC) = cs0(T ∗) +
∑M
i=1 V
S(λ, θi) + E[λ>ri(ωi)].
The expressions cs0(T ∗) and cs(T ∗DEC) above character-
ize the tradeoff between the retailer’s surplus target F and
consumers’ surplus cs induced by the tariffs T ∗ and T ∗DEC,
respectively. Indeed, noting the linear dependence of A∗ in
F , it becomes clear that in both cases the rs-cs tradeoff is
linear, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Moreover, the fact that the
social welfare achieved in both cases (sw∗0 and sw(T ∗DEC)) does
not depend on F implies that said tradeoff is not only linear
but one-to-one (i.e., the Pareto fronts in Fig. 1 have slope
−1). This means that while an increased net revenue target
F+∆F decreases consumer surplus in expectation, it does not
decrease social surplus. Conversely, the integration of DERs
behind-the-meter increases both social and consumer surplus
by
∑M
i=1 V
S(λ, θi)+E[λ>ri(ωi)] in expectation regardless of
the retailer’s net revenue target F .
Another implication of the optimal two-part tariff T ∗DEC is the
likely impact it would have on the rapid adoption of behind-
the-meter DERs. Prevailing tariffs that rely on retail markups
to achieve revenue adequacy provide an strong incentive for
customers to integrate Distributed Generation (DG). This is
because, under net-metering, the higher the retail prices, the
more savings DG represents. By eliminating retail markups
and imposing virtually unavoidable connection charges, T ∗DEC
generally reduces such savings. Hence, T ∗DEC is likely to
decelerate the adoption of decentralized DERs compared to
the prevailing less efficient retail tariffs. This suggests that
there is a tradeoff between efficiency and the rapid adoption
of behind-the-meter DERs.
1) Optimality of Net Metering: We have restricted the
regulator to offer net-metering two-part tariffs. There are,
however, alternative mechanisms to compensate DERs that
do not rely on net metering (e.g., feed-in tariffs). We argue
that the regulator cannot improve upon the efficiency attained
by T ∗DEC with more complex ex-ante tariffs under certain
condition. This holds true because T ∗DEC induces the same
efficiency attained by the social planner, which provides an
upper bound to the regulator’s problem (3).
Theorem 2. Suppose that customers have access to renew-
ables and storage. If wholesale prices λ and customers’ states
ω are statistically independent (i.e., λ ⊥ ω), then T ∗DEC is an
optimal solution of (3) among the class of ex-ante tariffs.
Namely, the restriction to two-part net metering tariffs,
which are simple and thus practical tariffs, imply no loss of
efficiency if λ ⊥ ω. The latter condition, however, makes the
result somewhat restrictive as it applies to loads not affected
by customers’ local randomness such as washers and dryers,
computers, batteries and EV charging but not to HVAC loads
or behind-the-meter solar and wind DG. Nonetheless, said
condition suggests that if the net load and λ are poorly
correlated (or either exhibits little uncertainty at the time the
tariff is fixed) then T ∗DEC may have a good performance.
C. Centralized (retailer-based) DER Integration
As an alternative to behind-the-meter DERs, we now con-
sider the case where the retailer installs DERs within the
distribution network. To that end, suppose that the retailer
has access to a renewable supply ro(ξ) ∈ RN+ and a storage
capacity θo ∈ R+. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the retailer determines the operation of storage before the
billing cycle starts (i.e., ex-ante)7. Assuming that the retailer
operates storage to maximize his net revenue, the resulting
surplus induced by a tariff T can be written as
rs(T ) = max
s∈U(θo)
E
[
M∑
i=1
T (qi(T, ωi)) − λ>(q(T, ω)− ro(ω)− s)
]
= rs0(T )− E[λ>ro(ξ)]− V S(λ, θo), (9)
The fact that the two last terms in (9) do not depend on
T facilitates obtaining the following result since both terms
simply offset the surplus target F when imposing rs(T ) = F .
Theorem 3. Suppose that the retailer has access to renew-
ables and storage as characterized in (9). Then the two-part
tariff T ∗CEN that solves problem (3) is given by
pi∗CEN = λ+ E[∇piD(pi∗CEN, ω)]−1E[∇piD(pi∗CEN, ω)(λ− λ)],
A∗CEN = A
∗ − 1M
(
V S(λ, θo) + E[λ>ro(ξ)]
)
(10)
7Allowing storage operation to be contingent on partial observations of
λ ∈ RN (say so(λ) ∈ RN ) only makes the maximum value of E[λ>so(λ)]
over so(λ) ∈ U(θ) in (9) hard to compute under general assumptions.
5where A∗, the connection charge in the absence of DER, would
be given by A∗ = 1M (F − E[(pi∗CEN − λ)>D(pi∗CEN, ω)]) .
We first note that, unlike Thm. 1, Thm. 3 does not require
∇piD(pi, ω) and λ to be uncorrelated. However, if this condi-
tion is satisfied it holds that pi∗CEN = pi
∗
DEC = λ. In other words,
under optimally set ex-ante two-part tariffs, the integration
of DERs by either customers or their retailer do not require
updating prices to maintain revenue adequacy. Hence, in both
cases, any potential feedback loop of DER integration on retail
prices (and thus on consumption) is undermined.
In terms of the connection charge in (10), the integration of
DERs by the retailer results in reductions relative to A∗. These
reductions contrast with the potential increments required by
customer-integrated DERs (cf., A∗DEC in (7)). The underlying
reason for such difference is intuitive, specially considering
the identical retail prices pi∗CEN = pi
∗
DEC. Decentralized DERs
represent savings in volumetric charges for customers (with
reduced net loads) whereas centralized DERs represent savings
in electricity purchases for the retailer. Because the latter
savings cannot increase the retailer surplus beyond F , they are
allocated uniformly between customers through reductions in
the connection charge.
Unlike with decentralized DERs in general, the welfare
gains brought by DERs integrated (and operated) by the
retailer do not depend on retail tariffs. This is formalized by
the following result.
Corollary 2. Under the tariff T ∗CEN, retailer-integrated
DERs induce an expected total surplus sw(T ∗CEN) = sw
∗
0 +
V S(λ, θo) + E[λ>ro(ξ)] that is independent of F and
cs(T ∗CEN) = cs0(T ∗) + V S(λ, θo) + E[λ>ro(ξ)].
In Cor. 2, cs(T ∗CEN) characterizes a linear one-to-one tradeoff
between F and cs induced by the T ∗CEN. This tradeoff—
equivalent to the Pareto front induced by T ∗DEC in Fig. 1—
is characterized by the social welfare achieved by T ∗CEN,
sw(T ∗CEN). Consequently, similar to behind-the-meter DERs,
the integration of centralized DERs increases both social and
consumer surplus by V S(λ, θ0) + E[λ>r0(ω)] in expectation
regardless of the retailer’s net revenue target F .
The equivalent collective welfare effects of DERs integrated
under both models (characterized by Cor. 1 and 2) are in
contrast to their individual welfare effects. As suggested
above, welfare gains (or losses) from decentralized DERs
are captured individually by DER-integrating customers as
reductions in their bills and as bill reductions or increments for
all other customers due to the adjustments to the connection
charge A∗DEC. This allocation of welfare gains constitutes
an interclass cross-subsidy between customers. Conversely,
welfare gains from centralized DERs are uniformly captured
by all customers as reductions in the connection charge A∗CEN.
Lastly, an implication of T ∗CEN is the likely impact it has
on the adoption of DERs. The reduction in the connection
charge characterized by A∗CEN relative to A
∗ is the net benefit
perceived by each customer due to the integrated centralized
DERs. Hence, customers should be willing to let the retailer
integrate DERs even if they entail capital costs that offset a
portion of said reductions in the connection charge.
III. AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY
In this section, we analyze a case study of a hypothetical
distribution utility that faces New York city’s wholesale prices
and residential demand for an average summer day. We
compare the performance of several day-ahead tariffs with
hourly prices at different levels of solar and storage capacity.
Besides the optimal two-part tariff, we study other tariff
structures with two pricing alternatives (flat pricing or hourly
dynamic pricing) and with daily connection charges fixed at
various levels: zero, a nominal value reflecting Con Edison’s
connection charge, the nominal value plus 0.33 $/day (10
$/month), and the nominal value plus 1.66 $/day (50 $/month).
Similar tariff reforms are being proposed in practice to solve
utilities’ fixed cost recovery problem [6]. Given a tariff struc-
ture, we optimize the non-fixed parameters to maximize the
expected consumer surplus subject to revenue adequacy.
This case study uses the same demand model as in Part I
[1], which comprises a linear demand function and a quadratic
utility function for each customer. We use publicly available
energy sales data and rates from Con Edison for the 2015
Summer to fit the demand model. Con Edison’s default tariff
for its 2.2 million residential customers is essentially a two-
part tariff T CE with a flat price of piCE = 17.2 ¢/kWh and a
connection charge of 15.76 $/month (ACE = 0.53 $/day). We
use day-ahead wholesale prices for NYC from NYISO.
A. Base case
This is the case without DERs and nominal tariff T CE.
Throughout the case study, we assume an average price
elasticity of the total daily demand of ε(piCE) = −0.3 at piCE,
which is a reasonable estimate of the short-term own-price
elasticity of electricity demand [27]. Moreover, we consider
a total of M = 2.2 million residential customers and use the
tariff T CE to compute the utility’s average daily revenue from
the residential segment and the portion that contributes towards
fixed costs, which amount respectively to rev(T CE) = $7.19
million (M) dollars and
F CE := rs0(T CE) = rev(T CE)− E [λ>D(1piCE, ω)] = $5.83M.
For the sake of brevity, the details of these computations
already described in Part I [1] are not reproduced here.
We illustrate in Fig. 2a the expected retailer surplus (rs)
and expected consumer surplus (cs) induced by the revenue
adequate tariff that maximizes the expected consumer surplus
within each tariff structure for different values of F . For
each tariff structure, the resulting parametric curve is a Pareto
front that quantifies the compromise between cs and the rs
target, F . We plot these curves as (possibly negative) surplus
gains relative to the values induced by T CE, rs0(T CE) and
cs0(T CE) = $9.54M, normalized by rev(T CE).
We make some observations from Fig. 2a. First, the −1
slope of the Pareto front associated to the optimal two-part
tariff T ∗ corroborates that the induced efficiency sw(T ∗) does
not depend on F . Conversely, the larger the F , the more
inefficient the suboptimal two-part tariffs considered become.
This can be seen from the non-unitary slopes exhibited by
all tariffs except T ∗. Second, at the nominal rs target F CE
6(i.e., the horizontal axis), significant differences in the induced
cs gains are observed among the tariffs. In particular, moving
from flat prices to hourly prices improves cs by approximately
1% ($72k/day). A more significant cs gain (8.1%) is brought
by also increasing the connection charge to the optimal level
(which amounts to A∗ = 2.65 $/day or 79.5 $/month). Con-
versely, decreasing the connection charge to zero reduces cs
by 4.8%. These empirical computations suggest that additional
fixed costs can be recovered more efficiently by increasing
connection charges than by pricing more dynamically.
B. Tariff structure and net benefits of DERs
We now analyze the combined impact of tariff structure and
DER integration on consumers’ surplus. We measure changes
in cs relative to cs0(T CE) and normalized by rev(T CE).
1) Customer-integrated DERs: We start by estimating
changes in cs as a function of the solar and battery storage
aggregate capacity integrated by customers. The tariffs here
considered are applied to the hourly net metered demand, so
they differ from existing net metering tariffs with rolling credit.
Moreover, we model the integration of renewable resources
using hourly solar PV generation data from a simulated 5kW-
DC-capacity rooftop system located in NYC8. Similarly, we
consider the basic specifications of a 6.4 kWh Tesla Powerwall
battery9. We integrate as many of these systems as necessary
to reach the specified level of capacity.
In Fig. 2b we plot the Pareto fronts associated to three types
of tariffs and three decentralized solar PV integration levels.
This figure is a zoomed-out version of Fig. 2a computed for
three DER integration levels. As such, it gives a rough intuition
of how decentralized DERs transform the Pareto fronts of
different tariff structures and, in turn, affect cs. In general,
horizontal differences between the Pareto fronts represent
changes in cs due to tariff structure and/or to different levels
of decentralized DER integration, for certain F . Evidently,
for any F , decentralized DERs bring cs gains if the flat
tariff structure is replaced by the optimal two-part tariff T ∗DEC.
Conversely, cs losses are brought by the DERs for F = F CE
if the adjusted flat tariff structure is kept, or if it is replaced by
the “dynamic, nominal A” structure. We quantify these changes
in cs for F = F CE explicitly with the following parametric
analysis over the decentralized DER integration level.
In Fig. 3a, for several tariff structures, we plot the nor-
malized cs gains (or, equivalently, the sw gains) caused by
increments in the PV capacity integrated by customers and
the corresponding updates to the tariff required to maintain
revenue adequacy, i.e., rs(T ) = F CE. This case assumes that
the storage capacity integrated is half the PV capacity.
In particular, Fig. 3a shows how integrating decentralized
DERs can trigger both efficiency gains and losses depending
on the tariff structure. For example, the curve for the adjusted
flat tariff T CE suggests that maintaining revenue adequacy with
flat rate increments would cause DERs to bring no significant
8“Typical year” solar power data for the same months as temperature is
taken from NREL’s PVWatts Calculator available in http://pvwatts.nrel.gov.
9More precisely, a 3.3 kW charging/discharging rate and a 96% charg-
ing/discharging efficiency are used.
net gains or losses in cs and sw for small levels of integration.
However, DER integration levels beyond 500 MW would bring
increasingly larger losses in cs and sw of 1.3% at 1.1 GW and
15% at 2 GW. A similar performance is shown by the optimal
linear tariff (dynamic pricing) with nominal connection charge
ACE. The gain of 1% it exhibits with no DERs vanishes to
0% at 1.1 GW of PV, becoming net efficiency losses for
higher levels of DER. The optimal linear tariffs with higher
connection charges —10 and 50 $/month larger than the
nominal—, which bring initial efficiency gains of 2.8% and
7.7%, respectively. While the gains of the former increase to
then decrease after reaching a maximum of 3.5%, the gains
of the latter monotonically increase reaching 13.6% at the
maximum PV capacity considered, 2.2 GW. Other example
is the flat tariff with no connection charge, which starts with
efficiency losses of 6.8% that increase sharply up to 20.4%
at 1.1 GW. Lastly, the optimal two-part tariff starts with an
efficiency gain of 8.2%, and it lets customer-integrated DERs
to generate their full value, which amounts to an additional
6.6% of efficiency at 2.2 GW or 3% per GW. In other terms,
the efficiency gains foregone by using the adjusted flat tariff
T CE rather than the optimal two-part tariff T ∗ increase linearly
with the level of DER integration and reach 29.3% (or $2.11
M/day) at 2 GW.
In summary, connection charges embody a method for fixed
cost recovery that seems to be even more effective than
dynamic pricing in the sense that it can harness at least 90% of
the efficiency gains attained by the optimal two-part tariff for
all the integration levels considered, whereas dynamic pricing
alone can harnesses at most 12.5% and it generates efficiency
losses for higher integration levels. A word of caution on tariffs
with high connection charges and lower flat prices, however,
is that they induce customers to consume more on peak, thus
precipitating the need for network upgrades that increase the
retailer’s fixed costs in a way not captured by our model.
This problem can be tackled using dynamic prices and high
connection charges to recover fixed costs, such as the optimal
two-part tariff, and more forcefully by considering endogenous
fixed costs dependent of the coincident peak net-load.
2) Retailer-integrated DERs: We now estimate changes in
surplus as a function of the solar and battery storage capacity
integrated by the retailer. For the sake of a fair comparison,
DERs with the same characteristics as before are used.
In Fig. 3b, for several tariff structures, we plot the normal-
ized gains in cs and sw caused by increments in the PV and
storage capacity integrated (in a 2:1 ratio) by the retailer and
the corresponding tariff updates required to maintain revenue
adequacy. The figure reveals that the DERs bring monotonic
surplus gains under all the tariffs considered. This is because
the benefits brought by centralized DERs are not offset by the
consumption inefficiencies induced by decentralized DERs. In
fact, the inefficiencies induced by suboptimal tariffs without
DERs are slightly mitigated by centralized DERs because
these DERs help the retailer recover a small portion of F .
Hence, Fig. 3b suggests that the changes in cs and sw
brought by retailer-integrated DERs are virtually unbiased
by tariff structure. This is unlike customer-integrated DERs
whose effect on cs and sw is significantly biased by tariff
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Fig. 2: (a) Normalized retailer surplus target v.s. induced consumer surplus gain (Pareto front) for various tariffs in base case (i.e., no DERs). In (b) and (c),
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Fig. 3: Expected gains in consumer and social surplus induced by (a) behind-the-meter solar-plus-battery capacity and (b) retailer-integrated solar-plus-battery
capacity under different types of tariffs. Gains are measured relative to base case with tariff T CE and no DERs. In (c), cross-subsidies from customers without
solar to customers with solar v.s. level of behind-the-meter solar integration.
structure changes, and specially, by the reliance on retail price
markups for fixed cost recovery, as it is evident in Fig. 3a. In
other words, under tariffs with significant retail markups, while
centralized DERs generally bring surplus gains, decentralized
DERs tend to mitigate surplus gains or bring surplus losses.
It also clear from Fig. 3 that dynamic pricing and higher
connection charges help consistently (i.e., regardless the level
of DER integration) to mitigate existing inefficiencies. No-
tably, connection charges seem to offer a much more effective
measure to mitigate such inefficiencies than dynamic pricing.
C. Cross-subsidies induced by net metering
Considering the inequity concerns raised by using net
metering as a mechanism to compensate DERs [11] [9, Sec.
9.5], it is instructive to quantify the cross-subsidies induced
by the tariffs in the previous section. To that end, we compute
the cross-subsidies between PV owners and non-PV owners
for different levels of customer-integrated solar PV capacity.
For a given tariff structure and level of (decentralized) solar
integration, the cross-subsidy is computed by first obtaining
the contribution that PV owners make towards the fixed costs
F . Similarly, the contribution that PV owners would make
under a version of the given tariff that settles consumption
and generation separately is also computed. This version,
which is also optimized subject to revenue adequacy, settles
all consumption at the rates pi and all generation at the prices
λ10. Clearly, PV owners contribute less towards F under the
net metering tariff than its counterpart if the associated prices
are marked up as a means to recover the fixed costs F . We
compute said cross-subsidy as the difference between these
two values, normalized by F . Intuitively, cross-subsidies are
the difference between the costs that each group should pay
for and those they actually pay for, due to net metering.
The computation of cross-subsidies requires specifying in-
dividual demand functions and the distribution of solar ca-
pacity between customers. We consider a simple illustrative
case. Customers have identical demand functions except for a
scaling parameter σi satisfying σi = i ·σ for some σ > 0. The
5-kW solar installations are allocated to the largest consumers,
who have the greatest incentive to invest in solar generation.
10Customer-integrated storage is not considered in this analysis because
nonlinear tariffs make customers’ problem fundamentally more complicated.
8The resulting inter-class cross-subsidies are depicted in Fig.
3c. Evidently, all tariffs induce non-trivial cross-subsidies
except for the optimal two-part tariff which yields virtually no
cross-subsidy (in spite of the discussion in Sec. II-B1). This
is not entirely surprising since pricing according to pi∗DEC = λ
is efficient and consistent with cost causality. Hence, cross-
subsidies with such tariff happen only through the second
term in (7) which is rather small compared to A∗. The cross-
subsidies of all the other tariffs increase with PV capacity, and
they do it at an increasingly faster rate for flat tariffs.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We leverage the analytical framework developed in [1] to
study how retail electricity tariff structure can distort the net
benefits brought by DERs integrated by customers and their
retailer. This work is an application of Ramsey pricing with
extensions to accommodate the integration of DERs.
Our analysis offers several conclusions. First, while net
metering tariffs that rely on flat and higher prices to maintain
revenue adequacy provide increasingly stronger incentives for
customers to integrate renewables, they induce increasingly
larger cross-subsidies and consumption inefficiencies that can
outweigh renewables’ benefits. These significant inefficien-
cies have draw little attention in the literature compared to
the cross-subsidies. Second, net metering tariffs can achieve
revenue adequacy without compromising efficiency by using
marginal-cost-based dynamic prices and higher connection
charges. These tariffs, however, provide little incentive to
integrate renewables. Third, retailer-integrated DERs bring
customers net benefits that are less dependent on tariff struc-
ture, and they cause no tariff feedback loops. As such, this
alternative to behind-the-meter DERs seems worth exploring.
This study represents an initial point of analysis, for it has
various limitations. First, policy objectives beyond efficiency
and revenue sufficiency —often considered in practice— are
here ignored. Practical criteria such as bill stability make
“desirable” tariffs hard to be ever attained. Second, customer
disconnections are assumed to be not plausible as a customer
choice. This assumption becomes increasingly less realistic
with the decline of DER costs. Lastly, retailer non-energy costs
are assumed to be fixed and independent of the coincident
(net) peak load. Relaxing this assumption leads to peak-load
pricing formulations [28]. We discuss one such relaxation in
[4], where capacity costs are recovered with a demand charge
applied to the net demand coincident with the peak period.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: To solve the optimization problem (3)
over affine tariffs of the form T (d) = A + pi>d, we obtain
expressions for cs(T ) and rs(T ) in terms of the parameters pi
and A, considering the customer-integrated DERs.
On one hand, from the separability implications of the
linearity of T on the customers’ problem established in Sec.
9csi(T ) = max
qi(·),si(·)
{
E
[
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− T
(
qi(ωi)− ri(ωi)− si(ωi)
)] ∣∣∣si(ωi) ∈ U(θi)}
= E
[
Si(qi∗(T, ωi), ωi)− T
(
qi∗(T, ωi)− ri(ωi)− si∗(T, ωi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
di∗(T,ωi)
)]
(11)
II-B, we have that customers with DERs obtain an expected
surplus
csi(T ) = E[Si(Di(pi, ωi))− T (di(pi, ωi))]
= csi0(T ) + E[pi>(s∗(pi, θi) + ri(ωi))],
where csi0(T ), the expected consumer surplus without DERs,
is computed according to (1), i.e.,
csi0(T ) = E
[
Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)− pi>Di(pi, ωi)]−A. (12)
On the other hand, since this case does not consider retailer-
integrated DERs, the retailer derives an expected surplus
rs(T ) =
M∑
i=1
E[T (di(pi, ωi))− λ>di(pi, ωi)]
= rs0(T )−
M∑
i=1
E[(pi − λ)>(s∗(pi, θi) + ri(ωi))]
where rs0(T ), the expected retailer surplus without DERs, is
computed according to (2), i.e.,
rs0(T ) = A ·M +
M∑
i=1
E
[
(pi − λ)>Di(pi, ωi)] .
We can now solve the constraint rs(T ) = F for A,
A = 1M
(
F − E
[∑M
i=1(pi − λ)>di(pi, ωi)
])
(13)
and replace it in the objective function of problem (3), cs(T ),
which yields
cs(T ) = sw0(T )− F +
M∑
i=1
E[λ>(s∗(pi, θi) + ri(ωi))] (14)
where sw0(T ) = cs0(T ) + rs0(T ), the expected total surplus
that T would induce in the absence of DERs, is given by
sw0(T ) =
M∑
i=1
E
[
Si(Di(pi, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(pi, ωi)] . (15)
One can then show that sw0(T ) is maximized over pi at
piDEC = λ (see proof of Theorem 1 in [1]), when ∇piD(pi, ω)
and λ are uncorrelated (see Cor. 1 in [1]). Moreover, each term
E[λ>s∗(pi, θi)] is also maximized over pi at piDEC = λ since
E[λ>s∗(pi, θi)] = λ>s∗(pi, θi) ≤ λ>s∗(λ, θi) = V (λ, θi)
for all pi ∈ RN . Consequently, the expression cs(T ) in (14) is
maximized over pi at pi∗DEC = λ. The strict concavity of sw0(T )
in pi (Prop. 4 in [1]) guarantees the uniqueness and optimality
of pi∗DEC and A
∗
DEC. Replacing pi and d
i(pi, ωi) in (13) for λ and
di(λ, ωi) according to (6), respectively, yields the expression
for A∗DEC in (7), where
A∗ = 1M
(
F + Tr
(
Cov
(
λ,D
(
λ, ω
))))
is the optimal connection charge without DERs for uncorre-
lated ∇piD(pi, ω) and λ (Corollary 1 in [1]). 
Proof of Corollary 1: Theorem 1 implies that if ∇piD(pi, ω)
and λ are uncorrelated then pi∗DEC = λ, which does not depend
on the parameter F . Hence, it is clear from (15) that sw∗0 ≡
sw0(T ∗), where T ∗(q) = A∗+pi∗>q, is also independent from
the parameter F . It follows from (14) that
cs(T ∗DEC) = sw
∗
0 − F +
∑M
i=1V (λ, θ
i) + E[λ>ri(ωi)]
and, since rs(T ∗DEC) = F at optimality,
sw(T ∗DEC) = sw
∗
0 +
∑M
i=1V (λ, θ
i) + E[λ>ri(ωi)].
Thus, sw(T ∗DEC) is also independent of the parameter F . 
Proof of Theorem 2: We show this result using arguments
analogous to those in the proof of Theorem 3 in [1]. That is,
we show that the optimal two-part tariff T ∗DEC attains an upper
bound for the performance of all ex-ante tariffs derived from
the social planner’s problem. To obtain a tight upper bound for
ex-ante tariffs only (rather than a looser bound for all possibly
ex-post tariffs), the social planner makes customers’ decisions
relying only on the information observable by each of them
(i.e., ωi) as opposed to based on global information (e.g., ξ =
(λ, ω1, . . . , ωM )).
Consider the social planner’s problem
max
{qi(·),si(·)}Mi=1
sw (16a)
s.t si(ωi) ∈ U(θi), i = 1, . . . ,M. (16b)
with
sw = Eξ
[
M∑
i=1
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>di(ωi)
]
which is related to the regulator’s problem (3) with customer-
integrated DERs. The notations qi(ωi), si(ωi), and di(ωi)
indicate the restriction of the social planner to make (causal)
decisions contingent only on the local state of each customer
ωi. Recall from (5) that the expected consumer surplus for
a given ex-ante tariff is given by cs(T ) =
∑M
i=1 cs
i(T ),
where csi(T ) can be written as in (11), and note that the
corresponding expected retailer surplus is given by
rs(T ) = E
[
M∑
i=1
T (di∗(T, ωi))− λ>di∗(T, ωi)
]
,
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and the expected total surplus by
sw(T ) = E
[ M∑
i=1
Si(qi∗(T, ωi), ωi)− λ>di∗(T, ωi)
]
= E
[ M∑
i=1
Si(qi∗(T, ωi), ωi)− λ>qi∗(T, ωi)
]
+ E
[ M∑
i=1
λ>(ri(ωi) + si∗(T, ωi))
]
.
The following sequence of equalities/inequalities shows that
problem (16) provides an upper bound to problem (3).
max
T (·)
{cs(T ) | rs(T ) = F}+ F
= max
T (·)
{cs(T ) + rs(T ) | rs(T ) = F}
= max
T (·)
{sw(T ) | rs(T ) = F}
≤ max
T (·)
sw(T ) (17)
≤ max
{qi(·)}Mi=1
E
[
M∑
i=1
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>qi(ωi)
]
+
M∑
i=1
max
si(·)
{
E
[
λ>(ri(ωi) + si(ωi))
] ∣∣ si(ωi) ∈ U(θi)}
(18)
= max
{qi(·),si(·)}Mi=1
{
sw
∣∣ si(ωi) ∈ U(θi), i = 1, . . . ,M}.
(19)
In particular, the inequality in (18) holds because sw(T )
depends on T only through qi∗(T, ωi) and si∗(T, ωi). This
implies that maximizing sw(T ) directly over {qi(·), si(·)}Mi=1
rather than indirectly over T (·) is a relaxation of the optimiza-
tion in (17). Clearly, the problem in (18) corresponds to the
social planner’s problem in (19) and (16).
It suffices to show now that T ∗DEC attains the upper bound in
(19). To that end, we use the independence sufficient condition
ω ⊥ λ. We show that, under said condition, the expected total
surplus sw(T ∗DEC) matches the upper bound. First note that the
condition ω ⊥ λ allows to rewrite the upper bound in (18)
and (19) as follows.
max
{qi(·),si(·)}Mi=1
{
sw
∣∣ si(ωi) ∈ U(θi), i = 1, . . . ,M}
=
M∑
i=1
max
qi(·)
Eωi
[
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− Eλ|ωi
[
λ|ωi]> qi(ωi)]
+ Eξ
[
λ>ri(ωi)
]
+ max
si(·)
{
Eξ
[
λ>si(ωi)
] ∣∣ si(ωi) ∈ U(θi)}
=
M∑
i=1
max
qi(·)
Eωi
[
Si(qi(ωi), ωi)− λ>qi(ωi)
]
+ λ
>
ri
+ max
si(·)
{
λ
>
si
∣∣∣ si(ωi) ∈ U(θi)}
=
M∑
i=1
Eωi
[
Si(Di(λ, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(λ, ωi)
]
+ λ
>
ri + λ
>
s∗(λ, θi),
where the last equality follows from the definition of the
demand function Di(pi, ωi) and the simplification of storage
operation policy under deterministic prices.
The result follows since the tariff T ∗DEC induces the same
expected total surplus if ω ⊥ λ, i.e.,
sw(T ∗DEC) = Eξ
[ M∑
i=1
Si(Di(pi∗DEC, ω
i), ωi)− λ>Di(pi∗DEC, ωi)
]
+ E
[ M∑
i=1
λ>(ri(ωi) + s∗(pi∗DEC, θ
i))
]
=
M∑
i=1
Eωi
[
Si(Di(λ, ωi), ωi)− λ>Di(λ, ωi)
]
+ λ
>
(ri + s∗(λ, θi)). 
Proof of Theorem 3: To solve problem (3) over affine tariffs
of the form T (d) = A + pi>d, we first need expressions for
cs(T ) and rs(T ) in terms of (pi,A), considering the retailer-
integrated DERs.
On the one hand, since this case does not consider customer-
integrated DERs, the customers derive an expected surplus that
remains unchanged, i.e., csi(T ) = csi0(T ). On the other hand,
(9) characterizes the expected retailer surplus induced by T
considering the retailer-integrated DERs.
According to (9), rs(T ) depends on the decision variables
(pi,A) only through rs0(T ). Hence, the regulator’s problem (3)
at hand, with parameter F , is equivalent to that of the regulator
without any DERs and parameter F˜ := F − V (λ, θo) −
E[λ>ro(ξ)], i.e.,
max
T (·)
cs0(T ) s.t. rs0(T ) = F˜ . (20)
Theorem 1 in [1] for the case without DERs characterizes the
optimal two-part tariff for problem (20). Applying this result
to problem (20) yields the desired result, i.e.,
pi∗CEN = λ+ E[∇piD(pi∗CEN, ω)]−1E[∇piD(pi∗CEN, ω)(λ− λ)]
and
A∗CEN =
1
M
(
F˜ − E [(pi∗CEN − λ)>D(pi∗CEN, ω)]
)
= 1M (F − E [(pi∗CEN − λ)>D(pi∗CEN, ω)])
− 1M
(
V (λ, θo)− E[λ>ro(ξ)])
= A∗ − 1M
(
V (λ, θo)− E[λ>ro(ξ)]) . 
Proof of Corollary 2: Applying Cor. 2 in [1] to problem
(20) implies that
cs(T ∗CEN) = sw
∗
0 − F˜
= sw∗0 − F + V (λ, θo) + E[λ>ro(ξ)]
11
where, according to (8), sw∗0 ≡ sw0(T ∗) does not depend on
F . The result follows since rs(T ∗CEN) = F further implies that
sw(T ∗CEN) = cs(T
∗
CEN) + rs(T
∗
CEN)
= sw∗0 + V (λ, θ
o) + E[λ>ro(ξ)]. 
